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Abstract 
This paper presents a simple framework for Horn­
clause abduction, with probabilities associated with 
hypotheses. It is shown how this representation can 
represent any probabilistic knowledge representable in 
a Bayesian belief network. The main contributions 
are in finding a relationship between logical and prob­
abilistic notions of evidential reasoning. This can be 
used as a basis for a new way to implement Bayesian 
Networks that allows for approximations to the value 
of the posterior probabilities, and also points to a 
way that Bayesian networks can be extended beyond 
a propositional language. 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we pursue the idea of having a log­
ical language that allows for a pool of possible hy­
potheses [Poole et a/., 1987; Poole, 1988], with prob­
abilities associated with the hypotheses [Neufeld and 
Poole, 1987]. We choose a very simple logical lan­
guage with a number of assumptions on the structure 
of the knowledge base and independence amongst hy­
potheses. This is intended to reflect a compromise 
between simplicity to implement and representational 
adequacy. To show that these assumptions are not un­
reasonable, and to demonstrate representational ade­
quacy, we show how arbitrary Bayesian networks can 
be represented by the formalism. The main contribu­
tions of this embedding are: 
• It shows a relationship between logical and prob­
abilistic notions of evidential reasoning. In par­
ticular it provides some evidence for the use of 
abduction and assumption-based reasoning as the 
logical analogue of the independence of Bayesian 
Networks. In earlier work [Poole, 1989; Poole, 
1990] a form of assumption-based reasoning where 
we abduce to causes and then makes assumptions 
in order to predict what should follow is devel­
oped; it is a similar mechanism that is used here 
to characterise Bayesian networks. 
• It gives a different way to implement Bayesian 
networks1. The main advantage of this implemen­
tation is that it gives a way to approximate the 
probability with a known error bound. 
• Because the underlying language is not proposi­
tional, it gives us a way to extend Bayesian net­
works to a richer language. This corresponds to 
a form of dynamic construction of Bayesian net­
works [Horsch and Poole, 1990]. 
In [Poole, 1991], it is argued that the probabilistic 
Horn abduction framework provides a good compro­
mise between representational and heuristic adequacy 
for diagnostic tasks. It showed how the use of variables 
can be used to extend the purely propositional diag­
nostic frameworks, and how the use of probabilities can 
be naturally used to advantage in logical approaches 
to diagnosis. 
2 Probabilistic Horn Abduction 
2.1 Horn clause abduction 
The formulation of abduction used is a simplified form 
of Theorist [Poole et a/. , 1987; Poole, 1988]. It is sim­
plified in being restricted to Horn clauses. 
Although the idea [Neufeld and Poole, 1987] is not 
restricted to Horn clauses (we could extend it to dis­
junction and classical negation [Poole et a/. , 1987] or 
to negation as failure [Eshghi and Kowalski, 1989]), in 
order to empirically test the framework, it is impor­
tant to find where the simplest representations fail. 
It may be the case that we need the extra represen­
tational power of more general logics; we can only 
demonstrate this by doing without the extra repre­
sentational power. 
We use the normal Prolog definition of an atomic sym-
1 For composite beliefs this is closely related to the algo­
rithm of Shimony and Charniak [1990], but also is devel­
oped for finding posterior probabilities of hypotheses (sec­
tion 3.2) 
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hoi [Lloyd, 1987]. A Horn clause is of the form: 
a. 
a <-aJ/1. .. .  /I.an. 
false <-a1 /1. •
.
• /1. an. 
where a and each a; are atomic symbols. false is 
a special atomic symbol that is not true in any 
interpretation2. 
An abductive scheme is a pair (F, H) where 
F is a set of Horn clauses. Variables in F are implic­
itly universally quantified. 
H is a set of atoms, called the "assumables" or the 
"possible hypotheses". Associated with each as­
sumable is a prior probability. 
Here (and in our implementation) we write 
assumable(h, p). 
where h is a (possibly open) atom, and p is a number 
0 � p � 1 to mean that for every ground instance h(} 
of h, hB E H and P(hB) = p. 
Definition 2.1 [Poole et a/., 1987; Poole, 1988] If g 
is a ground formula, an explanation of g from (F, H) 
is a subset D of H such that 
• FU D F g and 
• F U D � false. 
The first condition says that, D is a sufficient cause 
for obs, and the second says that D is possible (i.e., 
F U D is consistent). 
A minimal explanation of g is an explanation of g 
such that no strict subset is an explanation of g. 
2.2 Probabilities 
Associated with each possible hypothesis is a prior 
probability. The aim is to compute the posterior prob­
ability of the minimal explanations given the observa­
tions. Abduction gives us what we want to compute 
the probability of and probability theory gives a mea­
sure over the explanations [Neufeld and Poole, 1987]. 
To compute the posterior probability of an explanation 
D = { h1, ... , hn} of observation obs given observation 
obs, we use Bayes rule and the fact that P(obs!D) = 1 
2Notice that we are using Horn clauses differently from 
how Prolog uses Horn clauses. In Prolog, the database con­
sists of definite clauses, and the queries provide the neg­
ative clauses [Lloyd, 1987]. Here the database consists of 
definite and negative clauses, and we build a constructive 
proof of an observation. 
as the explanation logically implies the observation: 
P(Diobs) = 
P(obs!D) x P(D) 
P(obs) 
P(D) 
P(obs) 
The value, P( obs) is the prior probability of the ob­
servation, and is a constant factor for all explanations. 
We compute the prior probability of the conjunction 
of the hypotheses using: 
P(hnlh! /1. •. . /1. hn-d 
xP(h! /1. . . . /1. hn-J) 
The value of P(h1 /1. ... /1. hn-d forms a recursive call, 
with P(true) = 1. The only other thing that we need 
to compute is 
If hn is inconsistent with the other hypotheses, then 
the above conditional probability is zero. These are 
the cases that are removed by the inconsistency re­
quirement. If hn is implied by the other hypotheses, 
the probability should be one. This case never arises 
for minimal explanations. 
While any method can be used to compute this condi­
tional probability, we assume that the logical depen­
dencies impose the only statistical dependencies on the 
hypotheses. 
Assumption 2.2 Logically independent instances of 
hypotheses are probabi/istically independent. 
Definition 2.3 A set D of hypotheses are logically 
independent (given F) if there is no S C D and 
h E D\S such that 
F U S F h or F U S F ..,h 
The assumptions in a minimal explanation are always 
logically independent. 
Under assumption 2.2, if {hi, ... , hn} are part of a min­
imal explanation, then 
thus 
n 
P(h! /1. ... /1. hn) II P(h;) 
1=1 
To compute the prior of the minimal explanation we 
multiply the priors of the hypotheses. The posterior 
probability of the explanation is proportional to this. 
The justification for the reasonableness (and univer­
sality) of this assumption is based on Reichenbach's 
principle of the common cause: 
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"If coincidences of two events A and B oc­
cur more frequently than their independent 
occurrence, ... then there exists a common 
cause for these events ... " [Reichenbach, 
1956, p. 163]. 
When there is a dependency amongst hypotheses, we 
invent a new hypothesis to explain that dependence. 
Thus the assumption of independence, while it gives 
a restriction on the knowledge bases that are legal, 
really gives no restriction on the domains that can be 
represented. 
2.3 Relations between explanations 
The remaining problem in the probabilistic analysis is 
in determining the value of P( obs). 
When using abduction we often assume that the diag­
noses are covering. This can be a valid assumption if 
we have anticipated all eventualities, and the observa­
tions are within the domain of the expected observa­
tions (usually if this assumption is violated there are 
no explanations). This is also supported by recent at­
tempts at a completion semantics for abduction [Poole, 
1988; Console et a/., 1989; Konolige, 1991]. The results 
show how abduction can be considered as deduction 
on the "closure" of the knowledge base that includes 
statements that the given causes are the only causes. 
The closure implies the observation are logically equiv­
alent to the disjunct of its explanations. We make this 
assumption explicit here: 
Assumption 2.4 The diagnoses are covering. 
For the probabilistic calculation we make an additional 
assumption: 
Assumption 2.5 The diagnoses are disjoint (mutu­
ally exclusive). 
It turns out to be straight forward to ensure that 
these properties hold, for observations that we can 
anticipate3. We make sure that the rules for each 
possible subgoal are disjoint and covering. This can 
be done locally for each atom that may be part of an 
observation or used to explain an observation. 
''Vhen building the knowledge base, we use the local 
property that the rules for a subgoal are exclusive and 
covering to ensure that the explanations generated are 
exclusive and covering. 
Under these assumptions, if { e 1, . . .  , en} is the set of all 
explanations of g: 
P(g) P(e1 V e2 V ... V en) 
P(el) + P(e2) + ... + P(en) 
3Like other systems (e.g., [Pearl, 1988b)), we have to 
assume that unanticipated observations are irrelevant. 
3 Representing Bayesian networks 
In this section we give the relationship between 
Bayesian networks and our probabilistic Horn abduc­
tion. We show how any probabilistic knowledge that 
can be represented in a Bayesian network, can be rep­
resented in our formalism. 
Suppose we have a Bayesian network with random 
variables a1, .. . , an, such that random variable a; can 
have values v;, 1, . . . , v;,n, . We represent random vari­
able a; having value Vi,j as the proposition a;( Vi,j ). 
The first thing we need to do is to state that the values 
of variables are mutually exclusive. For each i and for 
each j, k such that j =P k, we have the rule 
false <--a;( v;,j) 1\ a;( vi,k) 
A Bayesian network [Pearl, 1988b] is a directed acyclic 
network where the nodes represent random variables, 
and the arcs represent a directly influencing relation. 
An arc from variable b to variable a represents the fact 
that variable b directly influences variable a; the rela­
tion influences is the transitive closure of the directly 
influences relation. Terminal nodes of a Bayesian net­
work are those variables that do not influence any 
other variables. The depth of a node is the length 
of the longest (directed) path leading into the node. 
A composite belief [Pearl, 1987] is an assignment of a 
value to every random variable. 
Suppose variable a is directly influenced by variables 
lla = b1, ... , bm (the "parents" of a) in a Bayesian net­
work. The independence assumption embedded in a 
Bayesian Network [Pearl, 1988b] is given by 
P(ailla 1\ v) = P(allla) 
where v is a variable (or conjunction of variables) such 
that a does not influence v (or any conjunct in v). 
The network is represented by a rule that relates a 
variable with its parents: 
a(V) <--b1 (VI) 1\ ... 1\ bm(V m) 1\ c_a(V, V1, ... , Vm) 
The intended interpretation ofc..a(V, V1, ... , Vm) is that 
a has value V because b1 has value V1, ... , and bm has 
value Vm. 
Associated with the Bayesian network is a contingency 
table which gives the marginal probabilities of the val­
ues of a depending on the values of b1, ... , bm. This will 
consist of probabilities of the form 
P(a = vibl =vJ, ... ,bm=vm)=p 
This is translated into the assertion 
assumable(c_a(v, v1, v2, . .. , vm), p). 
Nodes with no parents can be just made assumable, 
with the appropriate probabilities (rather than invent­
ing a new hypothesis and the above procedure would 
prescribe). 
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Figure 1: An influence diagram for a smoking alarm. 
Example 3.1 Consider a representation of the influ­
ence diagram of figure 3.1, with the following condi­
tional probability distributions: 
p(fire) 0.01 
p( smokelfire) 0.9 
p(smokel...,fire) 0.01 
p(tampering) 0.02 
p(alarmlfire 1\ tampering) = 0.5 
p(alarmlfire A -,tampering) = 0.99 
p(alarml...,fire 1\ tampering) 0.85 
p(alm·ml...,fire A -,tampering) 0.0001 
p(leavinglalarm) 0.88 
p( leaving l...,a[arm) 0.001 
p(report ileaving) 0.75 
p(reportHeaving) 0.01 
The following is a representation of this Bayesian net­
work in out formalism. 
assumable( fire(yes), 0.01 ). 
assumable( fire(no), 0.99 ). 
false <- fire(yes), fire(no). 
srnoke(Srn) <- fire(Fi), 
c_srnoke(Srn,Fi). 
false <- srnoke(yes), 
srnoke(no). 
assumable( c_srnoke(yes,yes), 0.9 ). 
assumable( c_srnoke(no,yes), 0.1 ). 
assumable( c_srnoke(yes,no), 0.01 ). 
assumable( c_srnoke(no,no), 0.99 ). 
assumable( tarnpering(yes), 0.02 ). 
assumable( tarnpering(no), 0.98 ). 
alarrn(Al) <- fire(Fi), tarnpering(Ta), 
c_alarrn(Al,Fi,Ta). 
false <- alarrn(yes), 
alarrn(no). 
assumable( c_alarrn(yes,yes,yes), 0.50 ). 
assumable( c_alarrn(no,yes,yes), 0.50 ) . 
assumable( c_alarrn(yes,yes,no), 0.99 ) . 
assumable( c_alarrn(no,yes,no), 0.01 ) . 
assumable( c_alarrn(yes,no,yes), 0.85 ) . 
assumable( c_alarrn(no,no,yes), 0.15 ) . 
assumable( c_alarrn(yes,no,no), 0.0001 ). 
assumable( c_alarrn(no,no,no), 0. 9999 ) . 
leaving(Le) <- alarrn(Al), 
c_leaving(Le,Al). 
false <- leaving(yes), 
leaving(no). 
assumable( c_leaving(yes,yes), 0.88 ). 
assumable( c_leaving(no,yes), 0.12 ). 
assumable( c_leaving(yes,no), 0.001 ). 
assumable( c_leaving(no,no), 0.999 ). 
report(Le) <- leaving(Al), 
c_report(Le,Al). 
false <- report(yes), 
report(no). 
assumable( c_report(yes,yes), 0.75 ). 
assumable( c_report(no,yes), 0.25 ). 
assumable( c_report(yes,no), 0.01 ) . 
assumable( c_report(no,no), 0.99 ). 
3.1 Composite Beliefs 
A composite belief [Pearl, 1987] is an assignment of 
a value to every random variable. The composite be­
lief with the highest probability has also been called 
a MAP assignment [Charniak and Shimony, 1990]. 
These composite beliefs have been most used for di­
agnosis [de Kleer and Williams, 1987; de Kleer and 
Williams, 1989; Peng and Reggia, 1990] (see [Poole 
and Provan, 1990] for a discussion on the appropriate­
ness of this) . 
Lemma 3.2 The minimal explanations of the termi­
nal variables having particular values correspond to the 
composite beliefs in the Bayesian network with the ter­
minals having those values. The priors for the expla­
nations and the composite beliefs are identical. 
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The proof of this lemma and for lemma 3.4 appears in 
appendix A. 
As the same procedure can be used to get from the pri­
ors of composite hypotheses and explanations to the 
posteriors given some observations, the following the­
orem is a direct corollary of lemma 3.2. 
Theorem 3.3 If the observed variables include all 
terminal variables, the composite beliefs with the ob­
served variables having particular values correspond 
exactly to the explanations of the observations, and 
with the same posterior probability. 
If the observed variables do not include all terminal 
values, we need to decide what it is that we want the 
probability of [Poole and Provan, 1990]. If we want to 
commit to the value of all variables, we consider the set 
of possible observations that include assigning values 
to terminal nodes. That is, if o was our observation 
that did not not include observing a value for variables 
a, then we need to consider the observations o /\ a(v), 
for each tuple v of values of variables a. To find the 
accurate probabilities we need to normalise over the 
sum of all of the explanations. "'hether or not we 
want to do this is debatable. 
3.2 Posterior Probabilities of Propositions 
In the previous section, the observations to be ex­
plained corresponded exactly to the conditioning vari­
ables. This corresponds to the use of "abduction" in 
[Poole, 1989]. In this section we show a relationship to 
the combination of abducing to causes and default rea­
soning to predictions from these causes [Poole, 1989; 
Poole, 1990]. 
Let expl( a) be the set of minimal explanations of 
proposition (or conjunction) a. Define 
M(a) = L P(E) 
EEexpl(a) 
Lemma 3.4 If H is a set of assignments to variables 
in a Bayesian Network, and H' is the analogous propo­
sitions to H in the corresponding probabilistic Horn 
abduction system, then 
P(H) = M(H') 
A simple corollary of the above lemma can be used 
to determine the posterior probability of a hypothesis 
based on some observations: 
Theorem 3.5 
P( . _ ·I b ) _ M(obs' A xi(v;)) x,- v, o s -
M(obs') 
The denominator can be obtained by finding the ex­
planations of the observations. The numerators can be 
obtained by explaining Xi( vi) from these explanations. 
4 Best-first abduction 
We are currently experimenting with a number of im­
plementations based on Logic programming technol­
ogy or on ATMS technology. These are implemented 
by a branch and bound search where we consider the 
partial explanation with the least cost (highest prob­
ability) at any time. 
The implementations keep a priority queue of sets of 
hypotheses that could be extended into explanations 
("partial explanations"). At any time the set of all the 
explanations is the set of already generated explana­
tions, plus those explanations that can be generated 
from the partial explanations in the priority queue. 
Formall , a partial explanation is a pair 
(g <- C, D) 
where g is an atom, C is a conjunction of atoms and 
D is a set of hypotheses. 
Initially the priority queue to explain a contains 
{(a<-a, {}), (false <- false, {})} 
We thus try simultaneously try to find explanations 
of a and "explanations" of false (forming nogoods in 
ATMS terminology) that can be used to prune other 
partial explanations. 
At each step we choose the element 
(g <- C, D) 
of the priority queue with maximum prior probability 
of D, but when partial explanations are equal we have 
a preference for explanations of false. 
We have an explanation when C is the empty conjunc­
tion. Otherwise, suppose C is conjunction a/\ R. 
There are two operations that can be carried out. The 
first is a form of SLD resolution [Lloyd, 1987], where 
for each rule 
a <- b1 /\ . . . /\ bn 
in F, we generate the partial explanation 
(g <- b1 A ... A bn A R, D) . 
The second operation is used when a E H. In this case 
we produce the partial explanation 
(g <- R, {a} U D) 
This procedure, under reasonable assumptions, will 
find the explanations in order of liklihood. 
4Here we give only the bare-bones of the goal-directed 
procedure; there is an analogous bottom-up procedure that 
we are also experimenting with. The analysis is similar 
for that procedure. We also only give the propositional 
version here. The lifting to the 11eneral case by the use of 
substitutions is straightforward LLloyd, 1987]. 
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It turns out to be straight forward to give an upper 
bound on the probability mass in the priority queue. 
If (g <- C, D) is in the priority queue, then it can possi­
bly be used to generate explanations D1, ... , Dn. Each 
D; will be of the form DUn;. We can place a bound 
on the probability mass of all of the D;, by 
p(D1 V ... V Dn) p(D II (Df V ... V D�)) 
< p(D) 
This means that we can put an bound on the range of 
probabilities of an goal based on finding just some of 
the explanations of the goal. Suppose we have goal g, 
and we have generated explanations 1J. Let 
Pv = L P(D) 
DE'D 
D:(g-C,D)EQ 
where Q is the priority queue. 
We then have 
P(D) 
As the computation progresses, the probability mass 
in the queue PQ approaches zero and we get a better 
refinements on the value of P(g). This thus forms the 
basis of an "anytime" algorithm for Bayesian networks. 
5 Causation 
There have been problems associated with logical for­
mulations of causation [Pearl, 1988a]. There has been 
claims that Bayes networks provide the right indepen­
dencies for causation [Pearl, 1988b]. This paper pro­
vides evidence that abducing to causes and making 
assumptions as to what to predict from those assump­
tions [Poole, 1989; Poole, 1990] is the right logical ana­
logue of the independence in Bayesian networks (based 
on theorem 3.5). 
One of the problems in causal reasoning that Bayesian 
networks overcome [Pearl, 1988b] is in preventing rea­
soning such as "if c1 is a cause for a and c2 is a cause 
for -.a, then from c1 we can infer c2". This is the prob­
lem that occurs in the Yale shooting problem [Hanks 
and McDermott, 1987]. Our embedding says that this 
does not occur in Bayesian networks as c1 and c2 must 
already be stated to be disjoint. We must have al­
ready disambiguated what occurs when they are both 
true. If we represent the Yale shooting scenario so that 
the rules for "alive" are disjoint the problem does not 
anse. 
6 Comparison with Other Systems 
The closest work to that reported here is by Char­
niak and Shimony [Charniak and Shimony, 1990; 
Shimony and Charniak, 1990]. Theorem 3.3 is anal­
ogous to Theorem 1 of [Shimony and Charniak, 1990]. 
Instead of considering abduction, they consider models 
that consist of an assignment of values to each random 
variable. The label of [Shimony and Charniak, 1990] 
plays an analogous role to our hypotheses. They how­
ever, do not use their system for computing posterior 
probabilities. It is also not so obvious how to extend 
their formalism to more powerful logics. 
This work is also closely related to recent embeddings 
of Dempster-Shafer in ATMS [Laskey and Lehner, 
1989; Provan, 1989]. One difference between our em­
bedding of Bayes networks and Dempster Shafer is in 
the independence assumptions used. Dempster-Shafer 
assume that different rules are independent. We as­
sume they are exclusive. Another difference is that 
these embeddings do not do evidential reasoning (by 
doing abduction), determining probability of hypothe­
ses given evidence, but rather determine the "belief" 
of propositions from forward chaining. 
The ATMS-based implementation is very similar to 
that of de Kleer and Williams [1987; 1989]. They are 
computing something different to us (the most likely 
composite hypotheses), and are thus able to do an A* 
search. It is not clear that including the "irrelevant" 
hypotheses gives the advantages that would seem to 
arise from using an A* search. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper presented a simple but powerful mecha­
nism for combining logical and probabilistic reasoning 
and showed how it can be used to represent Bayesian 
Networks. 
Given the simple specification of what we want to com­
pute, we are currently investigating different imple­
mentation techniques to determine which works best in 
practice. This includes using logic programming tech­
nology and also ATMS technology. We are also trying 
to the representational adequacy by building applica­
tions (particularly in diagnosis, but also in recogni­
tion), and based on this technology. 
It may seem as though there is something terribly ad 
hoc about probabilistic Horn abduction ( c.f. the ex­
tensional systems of [Pearl, 1988b]). It seems, how­
ever, that all of the sensible (where Lj M ( ai( Vi,j)) = 
1 for each random variable ai) representations (propo­
sitionally at least) correspond to Bayesian networks. 
The natural representation tends to emphasise propo­
sitional dependencies (e.g., where b is an important 
distinction when a is true, but not otherwise). These 
are normal Bayesian networks, but imply more struc­
ture on the contingency tables than are normally con­
sidered special. 
Representing Bayesian Networks Within Probabilistic Horn Abduction 277 
A Proof Outlines of Lemmata 
Lemma 3.2 The minimal explanations of the termi­
nal variables having particular values correspond to the 
composite beliefs in the Bayesian network with the ter­
minals having those values. The priors for the expla­
nations and the composite beliefs are identical. 
Proof: First, there is a one to one correspondence 
between the composite beliefs and the minimal expla­
nations of the terminals. Suppose x1, . . . , Xn are the 
random variables such that variable x; is directly in­
fluenced by x;,, . . .  , x; • .  The minimal explanations of 
the terminal nodes co�sist of hypotheses of the form 
with exactly one hypothesis for each x;, such that 
x;. (Vi;) is a logical consequence of the facts and the 
ex'planation. This corresponds to the composite belief 
XJ(vJ) 1\ ... 1\ xn(vn)· 
By construction, the proofs for the terminal nodes 
must include all variables. 
Suppose E is a minimal explanation of the terminal 
variables. To show there is only one hypothesis for 
each random variable. Suppose that x; is a variable 
such that there are two hypotheses 
in E. If some x;,(v;,) or Xi;(vl) is not a consequence 
of FUE, then the corresponding c..x; hypothesis can be 
removed without affecting the explanation, which is a 
contradictio� to the minimality of E. So each �i;(v;;) 
and Xi;(v:,) IS a consequence of FUE. By consistency 
of E each Vi; = vi; . The only way these assumptions 
can be different is if v; "# v:, and so we can derive 
x;(v;) and x;(v;) which leads to false, a contradiction 
to the consistency of E. 
Second, the explanations and the composite beliefs 
have the same prior. Given an assignment of value 
V; to each variable x;, define TI; by 
TI; = x;, ( v;,) 1\ ... 1\ x;., ( v; • . ) 
where x;,, . . . , x;., are the variables directly influencing 
Xi. 
By the definition of a Bayesian net, and the definition 
of c..x;, we have 
n 
II P(x;(v;)ITI;) 
n 
II C....Xi(Vi, Vil 1 ... , Vinj) 
i=l 
P(exp) 
Where exp is the explanation. 0 
Lemma 3.4 If H is a set of assignments to variables 
in a Bayesian Network, and H' is the analogous propo­
sitions to H in the corresponding Probabilistic Horn 
Abduction system, then 
P(H) = M(H') 
Proof: This is proven by induction on a well founded 
ordering over sets of hypotheses. This ordering is 
based on the lexicographic ordering of pairs (h, n) 
where h is the depth of the element of the set with 
maximal depth, and n is the number of elements of 
this depth. Each time through the recursion either 
h is red need or h is kept the same and n is reduced. 
This is well founded as both h and n are non-negative 
integers and n is bounded by the number of random 
variables. 
For the base case, where h = 1, we have all of the hy­
potheses are independent and there is only one trivial 
explanation. In this case we have 
P(H) = M(H') = II P(h) 
heH 
For the inductive case, suppose a(v) is a proposition in 
H with greatest depth. Let R = H\a(v). Under the 
ordering above lla U R < H, and so we can assume the 
lemma for n. U R. Note also that a does not influence 
anything in R (else something in R would have greater 
depth than a). 
P(H) P(a = v 1\ R) 
= P(a =viR) x P(R) 
( � P(allla 1\ R) x P(TiaiR)) x P(R) 
= LP(ailla) X P(TiaiR) X P(R) 
n. 
L P(ailla) x P(lla 1\ R) 
n. 
= LP(c...a(v,lla)) x M(TI�U R') 
n. 
LP(c...a(v,n.)) x E P(E) 
n. Eeexpl(n�AR') 
= E E P(c...a(v,TI.)) x P(E) 
n. Eeexpl(n.AR) 
E P(E') 
E'Eexpl(a( v)AR) 
M(a(v) 1\ R') 
= M(H') 
0 
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